ports/lang/python25/files/patch-modules_hashopenssl.c
Martin Wilke 8a1ff65b9b - Security fixes
Multiple vulnerabilities:

	1) Various integer overflow errors exist in core modules e.g. stringobject,
	   unicodeobject, bufferobject, longobject, tupleobject, stropmodule, gcmodule, mmapmodule.
	2) An integer overflow in the hashlib module can lead to an unreliable cryptographic digest results.
	3) Integer overflow errors in the processing of unicode strings can be exploited to cause
	   buffer overflows on 32-bit systems.
	4) An integer overflow exists in the PyOS_vsnprintf() function on architectures that do not
	   have a "vsnprintf()" function.
	5) An integer underflow error in the PyOS_vsnprintf() function when passing zero-length strings
	   can lead to memory corruption.

PR:		127172 (based on)
Submitted by:	bf <bf2006a@yahoo.com>
Obtained from:	python svn
Security:	CVE-2008-2315, CVE-2008-2316, CVE-2008-3142, CVE-2008-3144, CVE-2008-3143. (vuxml come later)
2008-09-08 00:14:06 +00:00

105 lines
3.1 KiB
C

--- Modules/_hashopenssl.c.orig 2006-05-29 22:04:52.000000000 +0100
+++ Modules/_hashopenssl.c 2008-08-30 10:43:27.000000000 +0100
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
/* EVP is the preferred interface to hashing in OpenSSL */
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#define MUNCH_SIZE INT_MAX
+
#ifndef HASH_OBJ_CONSTRUCTOR
#define HASH_OBJ_CONSTRUCTOR 0
@@ -164,9 +166,18 @@
if (!PyArg_ParseTuple(args, "s#:update", &cp, &len))
return NULL;
+ if (len > 0 && len <= MUNCH_SIZE) {
EVP_DigestUpdate(&self->ctx, cp, Py_SAFE_DOWNCAST(len, Py_ssize_t,
unsigned int));
-
+ } else {
+ Py_ssize_t offset = 0;
+ while (len) {
+ unsigned int process = len > MUNCH_SIZE ? MUNCH_SIZE : len;
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&self->ctx, cp + offset, process);
+ len -= process;
+ offset += process;
+ }
+ }
Py_INCREF(Py_None);
return Py_None;
}
@@ -255,9 +266,20 @@
self->name = name_obj;
Py_INCREF(self->name);
- if (cp && len)
+ if (cp && len) {
+ if (len > 0 && len <= MUNCH_SIZE) {
EVP_DigestUpdate(&self->ctx, cp, Py_SAFE_DOWNCAST(len, Py_ssize_t,
unsigned int));
+ } else {
+ Py_ssize_t offset = 0;
+ while (len) {
+ unsigned int process = len > MUNCH_SIZE ? MUNCH_SIZE : len;
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&self->ctx, cp + offset, process);
+ len -= process;
+ offset += process;
+ }
+ }
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -328,7 +350,7 @@
static PyObject *
EVPnew(PyObject *name_obj,
const EVP_MD *digest, const EVP_MD_CTX *initial_ctx,
- const unsigned char *cp, unsigned int len)
+ const unsigned char *cp, Py_ssize_t len)
{
EVPobject *self;
@@ -346,8 +368,20 @@
EVP_DigestInit(&self->ctx, digest);
}
- if (cp && len)
- EVP_DigestUpdate(&self->ctx, cp, len);
+ if (cp && len) {
+ if (len > 0 && len <= MUNCH_SIZE) {
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&self->ctx, cp, Py_SAFE_DOWNCAST(len, Py_ssize_t,
+ unsigned int));
+ } else {
+ Py_ssize_t offset = 0;
+ while (len) {
+ unsigned int process = len > MUNCH_SIZE ? MUNCH_SIZE : len;
+ EVP_DigestUpdate(&self->ctx, cp + offset, process);
+ len -= process;
+ offset += process;
+ }
+ }
+ }
return (PyObject *)self;
}
@@ -384,8 +418,7 @@
digest = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
- return EVPnew(name_obj, digest, NULL, cp, Py_SAFE_DOWNCAST(len, Py_ssize_t,
- unsigned int));
+ return EVPnew(name_obj, digest, NULL, cp, len);
}
/*
@@ -410,7 +443,7 @@
CONST_ ## NAME ## _name_obj, \
NULL, \
CONST_new_ ## NAME ## _ctx_p, \
- cp, Py_SAFE_DOWNCAST(len, Py_ssize_t, unsigned int)); \
+ cp, len); \
}
/* a PyMethodDef structure for the constructor */